Coercive possible scenarios: That the State object

Coercive diplomacy is a threat
diplomacy whereby one of the actors threatens the other with repercussions,
whether of a military, economic or social nature. This diplomatic tactic
involves using the threat of the war in Europe or launching a nuclear attack in
exchange for ceding the requirements of the other state.

This diplomacy is therefore an
instrument of prevention and management of conflicts before the conduct of a
State that, otherwise, could end up causing a warlike confrontation in every
rule. The purpose of armed actions is to intimidate and influence rival
political decision-makers, not to destroy their military force. However, in
some cases the level of force used can reach levels that make it difficult to
draw a clear dividing line between coercive diplomacy and war.

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Coercive diplomacy succeeds when it
gets the rival state to stop and reverse the political action that motivated
the crisis. Its failure can materialize in two possible scenarios: That the
State object of the coercive diplomacy does not give up in its endeavor and
ends up accepting the alteration of the status quo and/or that the refusal
gives rise to an open armed conflict.

Therefore, the degree of success or
failure is measured in terms of the political results obtained and the
magnitude of force used. The higher the level of violence, the process will
have less coercive diplomacy and more open armed conflict. But the final
options are not reduced to a triumph or an absolute fiasco. Throughout the process,
the actors can modify their respective demands, reaching intermediate
agreements that avoid a confrontation, and that satisfy to a greater or lesser
extent the parties involved. In the case of DPRK, attempts at diplomacy are
still happening and it is yet unsure how it will turn out in the end, because
of DPRK’s very sensitive case.

The North Korean diplomacy line was the
result of the conflict between communism and capitalism during the Cold War,
which established the diplomatic policy of the state.

At the end of the Second World War,
Korea gained its independence after decades of Japanese occupation and wanted
to gain independence by using its allies during the war – the United States of
America (USA), China, the Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The start of the
nuclear program began in the 1960s, but it became more acute after the USSR and
China did not support it. The focus on developing nuclear weapons has come as a
result of no international leader paying any attention to North Korea. Leader Kim
Il-Sung, followed by his son Kim Jong-il and now his nephew, Kim Jong-un, chose
to apply the same diplomatic maneuver, that of the nuclear threat. North
Korea’s nuclear weapons drew concern of Europe and especially the United
States. For this reason, North Korean relations with the US and South Korea
have deteriorated.

Since the end of the Cold War until
today, North Korea has linked the development of nuclear weapons with a
philosophy of deterring any external aggression that could have questioned the very
existence of the communist regime. In February 2009, the United States
Information Society appreciated that Pyongyang perceived the role of its
nuclear weapons as a defensive, deterrent, instrument of coercive diplomacy,
rather than a proper offensive capability to carry out the war; moreover, it
was estimated that Pyongyang would not use nuclear devices against US forces or
territory, as long as the regime is not on the verge of a military defeat or
imminent dissolution of its control. All of this data outlines a rational
actor, primarily interested in preserving the domestic political status quo.

 Furthermore, in the next years US sees North
Korea’s nuclear capabilities are aimed at deterrence, international prestige
and coercive diplomacy and acknowledges that they do not know what would
motivate the use of a nuclear weapon by the North Korean regime. Although they
believe that DPRK would only try to use nuclear weapons against US forces or
their allies to preserve Kim’s regime, US does not know what it would take,
from North Korea’s perspective, to cross that threshold.

It is very clear in what direction Kim
Jong-un is moving forward: to have a full arsenal capable of keeping the United
States at risk for deterrence, but also for coercive diplomacy. Therefore, one
of the tactics thought by the US military is to simultaneously reinforce the
defense network and the ability to attack, in the face of possible North Korean
provocations, since in case one of its missiles reaches South Korean territory
it would cause great human losses. USA has 28,500 military personnel stationed
permanently in South Korea and carries out numerous military maneuvers with its

Seoul and Washington argue that their
military collaboration aims to confront the aggression of Pyongyang. In this
regard, the new US president, Donald Trump, and the interim president of South
Korea, Hwang Kyo-Ahn, committed last January to “strengthen” their
joint defense capacity. As stated in an article made by the US department of
state: “The decision of President Donald Trump and President Moon Jae-in to
regularize the Expanded Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG), the
foreign affairs and defense agencies of both countries have approved a new
framework for the group and have committed to an EDSCG meeting in the near
future.”1 This
means how the both allied countries are committed to deter North Korea.

North Korea seeks to develop atomic
weapons, it argues, in self-defense, although it has repeatedly threatened to
launch a nuclear attack against South Korea and its ally, the United States, if
the provocations continue as their joint maneuvers or the deployment of THAAD
anti-missile systems in the Korean peninsula.